"If there is nothing beyond the organic ...": Heredity and Culture at the Boundaries of Anthropology in the Work of Alfred L. Kroeber by Kronfeldner, Maria E.
If there is nothing beyond the organic ... 
 - 1 - 
 
 
 
"If there is nothing beyond the organic …": Heredity and Culture 
at the Boundaries of Anthropology in the Work of Alfred L. 
Kroeber 
 
Maria E. Kronfeldner 
 
 
Abstract 
When, in turn-of-the-20
th
-century America, Alfred L. Kroeber continued the 
work of Franz Boas, in establishing anthropology as an academic discipline in 
the US, he defined culture as a phenomenon sui generis. For this he asked 
geneticists to enter into a coalition against hereditarian thoughts prevalent at that 
time in the US. To goal was to make room for anthropology as part of academia 
and distinct from other disciplines. To this end, he crossed the boundary to 
biology in order to build the boundary and developed the concept of culture in 
close connection to the concept of heredity: culture as independent of biological 
heredity (culture as superorganic) and, at the same time, culture as heredity of 
another sort. I will first summarize the shifting boundaries of anthropology at the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century. I will then present Kroeber’s ideas on culture and 
show how the changing landscape of concepts of heredity influenced his views. 
The historical case serves to derive two general conclusions: that the concept of 
culture can play different roles in explaining human existence; that genetics and 
the concept of hard inheritance did not have an unambiguous unidirectional 
historical effect on the vogue of hereditarianism at that time; on the contrary, it 
helped to establish culture in Kroeber's sense. 
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Introduction 
“If there is nothing beyond the organic, let us quit our false and vain business and 
turn biologists….”.
1
 This is what anthropologist Alfred L. Kroeber (1876-1960) 
said in 1916 – a time when ideas about heredity changed a lot, when genetics 
established itself as an experimental science, when hereditarian thinking was 
gaining wide acceptance in the US, and – last but not least – when American 
anthropology emancipated itself from being a museum-based profession and 
became an academic discipline. In face of all this, Kroeber, who was a student of 
Franz Boas, was fighting for the boundaries and the autonomy of the new 
academic discipline, named anthropology, and within this for the boundaries and 
the autonomy of cultural anthropology, in face of physical anthropology. Not very 
surprisingly, this struggle included a severe opposition to certain kinds of 
hereditarian thinking, and it re-instantiated the divide between the ‘two cultures’ 
of science (natural sciences versus humanities, roughly) within the field of 
anthropology.  
Kroeber tried to accomplish his boundary work by focusing on a concept 
of culture that not only saves man from being ‘just another animal’ but gives 
cultural anthropology a distinctive phenomenon for study. According to him, 
culture is defined as not only independent but also analogous to biological 
heredity. Kroeber used the biologist's own concept of heredity to claim autonomy 
from them; and he stressed that the rise of a Weismannian, non-Lamarckian 
concept of inheritance, today often called ‘hard inheritance,’ and the 
correspondent denial of ‘soft inheritance' of acquired characteristics was 
necessary for the historical development of such a concept of culture.
2
 To put it 
briefly: Kroeber was building boundaries by crossing them.  
In other words, in times of disciplinary or field formation, other disciplines 
or fields, in this case mainly biology, serve as “both matrix and whetting stone,” 
as historian Ross claimed in general for the emergence of the social sciences in 
the US.
3
 This article can thus be taken as a case study on boundary work between 
                                                
1
 Kroeber (1916b: 296). 
2
 Kroeber himself did not use the terms hard or soft inheritance and today these terms are not 
always used in the same way. I will use them in the following sense: hard inheritance is what 
Weismann’s concept of inheritance implied, while soft inheritance is the exact opposite, implying 
that the hereditary material is malleable at any time, as for instance in Lamarckian inheritance. The 
term ‘Lamarckian’ is today used in unison for the idea of inheritance of acquired characteristics, 
even though Lamarck was by far not the only one referring to this kind of inheritance. It was 
common knowledge of his time and even Darwin believed in it. See Zirkle (1946) on the history of 
the idea from the Greeks to Darwin. Ernst Mayr (1982) is often quoted as the one who introduced 
the terms of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ inheritance. Cyril Darlington, however, used the term “hard 
heredity” already in 1959, as I learned from Jonathon Hodge (during the workshop “Heredity in 
the Century of the Gene” (Exeter, 2006). Yet, Darlington used the terms with a slightly different 
meaning (see Darlington 1959: 14, 54-56, and Appendix; compare Mayr 1982: 687).  
3
 Ross (2003: 211).  
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disciplines. At issue is a case of boundary work that has led, in the end, to a 
factual disunity: between biology and physical anthropology on the one hand, and 
cultural anthropology on the other hand.
4
  
In face of this, the article also serves two further purposes: To illuminate 
the development and role of the concept of culture in this boundary work and to 
address the impact of the concept of hard inheritance on the development of 
hereditarian thought. This is important since some historians have acknowledged 
what Kroeber said about Lamarckian soft inheritance of acquired characteristics.
5
 
Yet, they did not relate it to the development and role the concept of culture had 
in the history of the social sciences; they did also not concentrate on the 
consequences of Kroeber’s case for an historical account of the impact of the 
concept of hard inheritance on the formation of anthropology as an academic 
discipline, and of cultural anthropology as an autonomous field inside of it.
6
 In 
addition, while Tim Ingold, a contemporary anthropologist, criticizes Kroeber for 
being responsible for re-instantiating the two-culture divide in science and 
splitting man up into different compartments, this paper goes a step back. It first 
tries to explain what Kroeber exactly did, why he did so, and what we learn from 
his case.
7
  
In part 1, I will say a little bit more on the shifting boundaries of 
anthropology at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. This makes clear why Kroeber 
needed an opposition to hereditarian thinking. I will then analyze in part 2 how 
Kroeber used a Weismannian or non-Lamarckian concept of hard inheritance to 
secure the boundaries of cultural anthropology. This shows why he wanted 
geneticists to enter into a coalition with him in order to oppose hereditarians. I 
will end, in part 3, with some systematic conclusions on the concept of culture 
and on why Kroeber’s case is important for writing the cultural history of 
heredity.
8
  
                                                
4
 Superficially physical and cultural anthropology are still held together as a ‘sacred bundle.’ See 
Segal & Yanagisako (2005) for a critical discussion on whether this makes sense.   
5
 See for instance Stocking (1968: 250-269); Harris (1968: 121); Peel (1971: 143-146); Freeman 
(1983: 34-50); Degler (1991: 96-100).  
6
 Thus, it is not surprising that a standard history of anthropology, such as Patterson (2001), can 
ignore Kroeber’s reference to the concept of hard inheritance as important for his concept of 
culture. In turn, it is not surprising that Kroeber has been ignored in accounts of the impact of the 
concept of hard inheritance (as for instance in Paul 1995: 40-49) or in historical accounts of the 
history of hereditarian thoughts in general, as for instance in Ludmerer (1972). He is briefly 
mentioned by Kevles (1985).  
7
 See Ingold (2001). The critique is not new. Clifford Geertz (1966) already criticized a 
“stratigraphic” picture that assumes irreducible levels of biological, psychological and cultural 
(and social) layers in man. The critique has its own history and deserves separate treatment 
(historically and philosophically) that I hope to be able to deliver soon.  
8
 Although important, I totally left out a discussion of how the political and social dimension 
entered the need for boundary work, i. e. how industrialization, capitalism, imperialism, and the 
resulting social inequalities played a role in the formation of social sciences in general, and 
anthropology in particular. Many issues are involved, e.g. the heritage of imperialism in the social 
sciences, progressivism, democracy, the opening up of specialized higher education to the less 
educated classes as solution and symptom of industrialization, the regulatory control of behavior 
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1. The shifting boundaries of anthropology at the beginning of the 
20
th
 century 
That sciences are organized into disciplines, or sub-disciplines, means that 
conceptual boundaries are constantly built and rebuilt: the space of ideas gets 
delineated into areas of autonomy and exclusive authority over problems. Since 
ages, anthropology has conventionally been defined as ‘the science of man.’ At 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century, American anthropology was thought to 
comprise four parts: archaeology, linguistics, physical anthropology, and cultural 
anthropology (also called ethnology). At the same time, this four-field 
anthropology stopped being a mere museum based profession and became an 
academic discipline, with the usual outward signs this has: curricula, degrees, 
journals, disciplinary associations etc.
9
 Naturally, there was a need to define the 
boundaries of anthropology in the face of other academic disciplines and areas of 
research, such as psychology, biology in general, and genetics in particular. And 
this need was also a need to define the internal relationship between physical and 
cultural anthropology since these two fields had different affinities: the first 
tended towards natural sciences, the second towards humanities and the 
developing social sciences. This tension, created by the ‘two cultures’ of science, 
is felt in American so-called ‘four-field anthropology’ until today.
10
  
Marginalizing physical anthropology 
Franz Boas (1858-1942), founding figure of American academic anthropology, 
regarded physical anthropology as central to understanding the behavioural 
differences between groups of people: heredity, a phenomenon considered as part 
of physical anthropology, was for him one of several factors an anthropologist has 
to take into account in order to understand the development and behaviour of 
individuals. His student Alfred L. Kroeber was more radical. He tried to 
marginalize the field of physical anthropology. Kroeber grew up in a German-
Jewish-American intellectual context in New York and received Columbia’s first 
PhD in anthropology in 1901, the ninth in the whole US. Immediately afterwards, 
he got a permanent position. His job was to build up a department of anthropology 
at the University of California, Berkeley. By 1907 he was an important figure in 
the discipline and counts until today as the most influential figure in the 
establishment of American anthropology after Boas.
11
  
 
                                                                                                                                 
involved in the ‘disciplining’ of man. I did so deliberately since it would by far exceed the space 
available here. Useful entry points for this are Porter & Ross (2003) or Patterson (2001).  
9
 For more on the history of anthropology before it became a scientific discipline and how it 
developed since then see: Darnell (1971, 1998), Hinsley (1981), Patterson (2001).  
10
 See Segal & Yanagisako 2005.  
11
 See Bidney (1965) for a short review of his life and work, Steward (1973) for a book length one, 
containing a summary of the biography written by Kroeber’s wife Theodora Kroeber (1970); see 
also Thoresen (1975) on the establishment, financing, and development of academic anthropology 
in California. On the contested history of the four-field approach see Stocking (1988).  
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** FIGURE_1 about here ** 
 
For Kroeber, cultural anthropology was much more central; “the other parts were 
secondary and marginal and owed their significance to their contribution towards 
an understanding of culture history,” as the anthropologist David Bidney says in a 
review on Kroeber’s impact.
12
 Consequently, Kroeber never contributed anything 
important to physical anthropology.  
At the same time, others pulled in the exact opposite direction: they tried 
to marginalize cultural anthropology. This is the background why Kroeber talked 
about 'turning biologists'. The following example from the politics of science shall 
illustrate that anthropologists like Kroeber had quite concrete reasons to be afraid 
of losing their jobs. In other words, there was a practical or pragmatic pressure to 
secure the boundaries of anthropology by marginalizing physical anthropology 
and by opposing hereditarianism.  
Representation in the scientific bureaucracy 
Between 1916 and 1918, Boas and his students fought for their representation in 
America’s scientific bureaucracy. At issue were the posts for the National 
Research Council’s Committee on Anthropology. For historians of anthropology 
the story is well known. George E. Hale, the Director of the National Research 
Council, asked William H. Holmes (1846-1933), important figure in pre-Boasian 
American anthropology and defender of a racial interpretation of cultural 
differences, to organize the Committee on Anthropology. Holmes chose Ale? 
Hrdli?ka (1869-1943), who was a defender of physical anthropology as an 
independent discipline, to take the lead. The goal was to prevent that Boas and his 
students get control over the committee. Yet they could not totally ignore Boas. 
Holmes thus put Hrdli?ka, Boas, and Charles B. Davenport (1866-1944), 
geneticist and leader of the American eugenicist movement, on the list for the 
committee. Yet, Hale dropped Boas from the committee because of Boas’ anti-
war activism. In April 1917, Madison Grant (1865-1938), a wealthy racist 
propagandist, who published his best-selling book on the “Passing of the Great 
Race” in 1916, offered money for the committee’s work in exchange of 
membership in it. In the end, the committee consisted of Holmes, Hrdli?ka, Grant, 
and Davenport. And it was Davenport, who had been selected by Hale in February 
1918 to represent the interests of the Committee on Anthropology to the National 
Research Council’s Division of Medicine and Related Sciences.
13
 In a nutshell, a 
geneticist, who defended eugenic doctrines, came to represent anthropology in the 
                                                
12
 Bidney (1965: 268).  
13
 Yet, they did not manage to act in concert. As historian Patterson (2001: 57) has put it: “Grant 
perceived correctly that Hrdli?ka only wanted his money, and Davenport realized that Hrdli?ka 
had no interest in his eugenic investigations.” Davenport, Grant, and others, then formed the 
Galton Society explicitly as an anthropological one in 1918, to oppose Boas and his students, even 
though none of the founding members were trained in the new departments of Anthropology, as 
Cravens (1978: 115f) stresses. 
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scientific bureaucracy of the National Research Council. And this was at a time 
when there were already trained anthropologists to do so.
14
   
As the involvement of Holmes indicates already, the struggle for 
representation was coincident with the struggle for emancipation from the older 
generation of anthropologists such as Holmes, which were not trained as 
anthropologists and predominantly oriented towards a racial hereditarianism; and, 
last but not least, it was coincident with the general dominance of racism and 
eugenics in the US at that time. These are the three main contexts in which 
American cultural anthropologists formed for the first time a clear professional 
identity as cultural anthropologists.  
That Kroeber perceived a danger in the various developments just 
mentioned (and wanted others to perceive such a danger) is also evident from the 
language of war and territory that he used: according to him, biology is a 
discipline that “forged its weapons, taught itself their use, conquered a territory, 
and stands forth a young giant of prowess”, in order to “annex the antiquated 
realm of history that lay adjacent.”
15
  
Yet, in an astonishing twist, Kroeber used the biologist’s own concept of 
hard inheritance to keep up the two oppositions, against the institutional 
hegemony of biologists and against the scientific hegemony of hereditarianism. 
According to the historian Stocking, he was the only one among social scientists, 
who realized that the concept of soft inheritance (i.e. inheritance of acquired 
characteristics) prevented the autonomy of anthropology and other social 
sciences.
16
  
2. Alfred L. Kroeber’s boundary work: culture and/as inheritance  
Kroeber’s boundary work for anthropology found its first peak with a couple of 
papers between 1915 and 1917, ending with his famous article on “The 
superorganic” (1917), which established cultural determinism as his major 
doctrine.  
The psychic unity of man and the superorganic nature of culture  
Already in 1910, Kroeber laid down the basic frame of his point of view on 
culture, heredity, and anthropology. His example was morality: according to him, 
morality is governed by an innate, instinctual moral sense. Yet, variations in 
moral behaviour between “civilized” and “uncivilized people” are due to different 
cultural influences and not due to innate differences in the alleged moral sense. In 
other words, behavioural differences do not imply that there are essential inborn 
mental differences between groups of people: to the contrary, one should assume 
                                                
14
 For more on this and the history of the Committee on Anthropology see in particular: Stocking 
(1968: 270-308), Cravens (1978: 89-120); Patterson (2001: 55-60).  
15
 Kroeber (1916a: 34). 
16
 Stocking (1968: 259).  
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a psychic unity of mankind and explain the behavioural differences by the 
influence of what Kroeber called civilization, history, or culture.
17
  
From this assumption, Kroeber went on to describe culture as “outside of 
race and independent of the human body.”
18
 This means that culture determines, 
i.e. influences, culture (via behaviour), but it does not influence the body, at least 
not the innate racial basis of the respective behaviour, and vice versa. That culture 
influences and thus explains culture means that culture is for Kroeber a system or 
process sui generis. Culture is “superorganic”
19
 – ‘on top’, so to say, of organic 
matters, relying on “social inheritance or cultural transmission” instead of 
biological inheritance.
20
  
To understand his position clearly, the following points have to be taken 
into account: in his 1915 paper “Eighteen professions,” arguing for the autonomy 
of anthropology as a distinct discipline, Kroeber assured that the psychic unity of 
man is not a proved or disproved fact, but a necessary assumption for the 
“historian,” i.e., the anthropologist, since otherwise “his work becomes a vitiated 
mixture of history and biology”.
21
 Yet, at the same time, he acknowledges that 
history and biology are intertwined and that the degree of their contribution in the 
development of individuals cannot be tested.
22
 These two statements are not 
contradictory. On the contrary, the argument that culture is a process in its own 
right is compatible with Kroeber’s claim that the behaviour of individuals and 
their development is caused by multiple factors, culture being merely one of them. 
If, however, we look at culture itself, then we see that culture is independent of 
nature, i.e., a phenomenon that can only be explained by reference to pre-existing 
culture. It is from this inter-individual, almost phylogenetic perspective that 
culture always derives from previous culture, as a cell always derives from 
previous cells.  
The second issue that might cause misunderstanding is the issue about 
holism: Kroeber's paper on culture as superorganic is often treated as defending a 
strong holistic conception of culture.
23
 Even though I cannot decide this issue 
here, the following two points should be taken into account. First, although 
Kroeber believes that culture is maintained via individual mental states or 
individual actions, he also believes that “[c]ivilization is not mental action itself,” 
but rather “a body or stream of products of mental exercise”.
24
 This is not pointing 
                                                
17
 This psychic unity does not exclude individual differences. It is an “identity of average” as he 
makes most clear in Kroeber (1917: 194-203).   
18
 Kroeber (1910: 446).  
19
 Kroeber (1916b, 1917). He took the term ‘superorganic’ from Spencer's Principles of Sociology 
(1876).  
20
 Kroeber (1916c: 368).  
21
 Kroeber (1915: 285). 
22
 Kroeber (1915: 285). 
23
 For a critique of the concept of the superorganic understood in a holistic manner, see Bidney 
(1944), Herskovits (1948); the discussion in Kaplan (1965) shows that the actual issue is 
methodological and epistemological and not ontological: it is an issue about the distinctive 
subject-matter of anthropology.  
24
 Kroeber (1917: 189 and 192). 
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to an ontologically dubious whole; it is pointing to a causal inter-individual 
lineage of the effects of mental acts. In addition, although he sometimes wrote in 
1917 and 1919 as if individuals are mere passive bearers of culture (implying that 
their properties do not determine culture and vice versa, i.e., culture does not 
determine the properties of individuals) and as if culture is a special ontological 
substance, he recanted from this in 1952. He admitted that culture as a whole is 
not a peculiar emergent entity or substance and that individuals are more 
important than he put it in 1917. His goal in 1917, he himself says in 1952, was to 
establish the recognition of culture as an “autonomous” system, independent of 
“biological explanation”.
25
 My claim is that if the context of an opposition to 
hereditarianism is ignored, Kroeber’s claim about the superorganic nature (and its 
genesis) cannot properly be understood.
26
 And it was this opposition that 
correlates with a denial of the Lamarckian principle of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics.  
Inheritance of acquired characteristics  
In 1916, in a paper called “Inheritance by magic”, published in the American 
Anthropologist, Kroeber moved the denial of inheritance of acquired 
characteristics to the centre of his account. In order to do so, he referred to three 
important aspects of August Weismann’s (1834-1914) ideas on inheritance: first, 
that experiments failed to produce positive evidence for the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics; second, that all cases of evolution are explainable 
without reference to inheritance of acquired characteristics; third, that inheritance 
is ‘hard’: that the hereditary material is not produced by the organism, but present 
from the start, continuously existing, and protected against changes that occur in 
the somatic tissue. Acquired changes, i.e., changes to the somatic tissue of the 
organisms, are not heritable on this basis. In Kroeber’s words, Weismann’s “basic 
idea” was “that the hereditary substance is totally distinct from the organic body, 
and that therefore the fate of the individual cannot affect the race.”
27
 In addition, 
Weismann’s concept of heredity meant that the germ plasm exists over time 
                                                
25
 Kroeber (1952: 7, 22-3). Compare Kroeber & Kluckhohn (1952: 49), but without reference to 
Kroeber’s papers between 1916-7, or Bidney (1965: 273). 
26
 A point I originally took from Kuklick (2004). I thus depart from the conclusions drawn by 
anthropologists such as Bidney (1965), who derive from the failure of a total independence of 
culture from individuals that the concept of the superorganic did not make any sense. It did make 
sense, but only in a very specific way: namely, in the sense of a separate system of change and 
inheritance. Note that I use the term “system” or “process” to follow Kroeber with his late 
assertion that he does not regard culture as a “substance” (1952: 4, 22). With this I do not want to 
decide whether the ontological status of ‘culture’ has to be interpreted in a realistic or nominalistic 
manner. Do beauty or culture exist in themselves or do they merely exist in concrete beautiful 
things and culture bearing individuals? Either way one can ascertain that culture exists as an inter-
individual process or system, a system of change and heredity. In a similar sense, we can say that 
evolution is a process or system of change that exists, even though individual organisms vanish, 
without regarding evolution as a special substance, an extra entity existing in addition to and in the 
same sense as evolving entities. 
27
 Kroeber (1916a: 26).  
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independently of individuals. The germ plasm is thus sub-individual and inter-
individual at the same time – almost as superorganic, i.e. independent of 
individuals, as Kroeber assumed culture to be. Kroeber also referred to 
Mendelism, the “new branch of biological science,” as providing a corroboration 
of this concept of hard inheritance. Thus he writes that although Mendelians 
perceive themselves as opposed to Darwinism, “one of their fundamental 
achievements has been the involuntary confirmation by real knowledge of an idea 
first clearly grasped by a Darwinian theorist.”
28
  
And yet, despite Weismann and despite Mendelism, the principle of the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics was still quite popular in the first 20 years 
of the 20
th
 century. Because of this, Kroeber called his paper “Inheritance by 
magic,” asserting that “if found in the minds of uncivilized people,” the belief in 
the inheritance of acquired characteristics “would be described as belief in 
sympathetic magic.”
29
 Kroeber thus asks the question why the people still believed 
in Lamarckian inheritance by using the conceptual toolkit of anthropology (magic, 
taboo, etc.).  
In light of this frame, he cites two motivations for the belief in the 
inheritance of acquired characters: first, Lamarckian palaeontologists (as well as 
Mendelians) maintain that Darwinism cannot explain the origin of variation. Thus, 
in order to account for the origin of variation some scientists call the inheritance 
of acquired characteristics to the rescue.
30
 Second, the general public and the 
social scientists stick to inheritance of acquired characteristics for another reason, 
as Kroeber states: they stick to it since they still do not distinguish between 
culture and race (synchronic perspective) and between cultural change and 
biological evolution (diachronic perspective) in a “consistent” manner. They 
confuse culture and nature.
 31
  
According to Kroeber, this confusion is caused by the assumption that 
cultural change, i.e. civilization, is evidence for and is causally linked to 
biological evolution. In Kroeber’s words, it arises from the assumption that “the 
acquisition of greater wealth or learning or skill by one group is evidence of a 
superior faculty for such acquisition inborn in that group through organic 
heredity.”
32
 This is what Kroeber calls the “fallacy that the social is organic.”
33
 
Those who “nominally” employ culture but regard it nonetheless as “ultimately, 
and in general directly, resolvable into organic factors,” are subject to this 
                                                
28
 Kroeber (1916a: 27). Yet, he also acknowledges that the dismissal of inheritance of acquired 
characteristics does not rest on empirical proof. In some circles, Kroeber notes, it has even become 
a “taboo” (Kroeber 1916a: 28).  
29
 Kroeber (1916a: 38).  
30
 Yet, Kroeber believes that this is not a viable route for Mendelians, since if they move back to 
Lamarckian inheritance, they run into a severe tension. See Kroeber (1916a: 30) 
31
 Kroeber (1916a: 31). Compare Kroeber (1916b: 295; 1916c: 370; 1917: 163).  
32
 Kroeber (1916a: 33).  
33
 Kroeber (1916a: 36).  
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fallacy.
34
 And what makes this fallacy possible is, according to Kroeber, the belief 
in Lamarckian inheritance.  
And indeed, take for instance Herbert Spencer (1855), at that time the most 
influential Lamarckian with respect to mental traits. He assumed that civilization 
is correlated with biological evolution. According to Spencer, civilization can only 
be explained by reference to Lamarckian inheritance, where ‘nurture’ becomes 
‘nature’ in each generation, leading to innate differences between races.
35
 New 
behavioural patterns become habits, which become instincts, via inheritance of 
acquired characteristics; these then play a role in the genesis of new behavioural 
patterns, which become habits, which then in turn become instincts, and so on. 
The explanation of the evolution of such mental abilities like intelligence, moral 
sense, or musical sense, is one of the reasons why Spencer opposed Weismann’s 
claims about the all-sufficiency of natural selection, which totally excluded 
inheritance of acquired characteristics. 
As part of the well-known debate about the all-sufficiency of selection, 
Weismann had already answered that Spencer ignores that tradition is an 
alternative to his Lamarckian explanation. In an essay on music in animals and 
man, Weismann (1892) claimed that we do not need Lamarckian inheritance to 
explain the evolution of man’s capacities and achievements, if we admit that there 
is tradition. According to Weismann, Spencer and others confused achievements 
(culture or cultural change) with innate abilities (nature or biological evolution). 
They thus ignore that the first can change without the latter. One can read 
Weismann as saying: Spencer’s claim about the impossibility to explain certain 
innate abilities in Darwinian terms is irrelevant since these innate abilities exist 
only in the mind of the observer. Weismann illustrated his point with the 
following thought example: is it possible that there was a Mozart in Samoa, a 
person with a musical sense or innate ability equal to Mozart’s? According to 
Weismann, it would indeed be possible. But since the hypothetical “Samoaner 
Mozart” could not build on already accumulated musical traditions and the 
corresponding culturally transmitted abilities, it was not possible that the 
Samoaner Mozart expressed his high musical sense the way the real Mozart did. 
Kroeber acknowledged Weismann’s essay and heavily relied on it, but regarded it 
as “a brilliant miss,” since in the end, Weismann “hastened to the inconsequent 
conclusion that faculties are probably different after all.”
36
  
The relationship between inorganic, organic and superorganic change 
It follows from Kroeber’s account that cultural evolution can proceed 
independently from biological evolution. Kroeber expressed this claim most 
clearly in the following figure 2:   
                                                
34
 Kroeber (1916a: 37). -- The influence of Boas is evident, since it was Boas who first stressed 
that culture, language, and race (i.e., the genetic endowment of people) do not covary. See Boas 
(1894), or Boas (1911).  
35
 See Richards (1987) and Gissis (2005) on Spencer.  
36
 Kroeber (1916a: 37).  
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Figure 2_The relationship between inorganic, organic and superorganic change, from 
Kroeber (1917: 211): With this graph, Kroeber intended to illustrate his cultural 
determinism, in which culture or superorganic change (dotted line) is a form of heredity, 
changing in an analogous but autonomous manner to biological heredity and organic 
change (dashed line) and inorganic physical persistence (continuous line). 
 
Kroeber presents the graph in order to stress that the lines, representing the three 
different systems of change (inorganic, organic, and superorganic) develop 
independently from each other. The important point is B, the first human that was 
able to learn socially from others; C would be the ‘primitive’ man and D the 
present moment.
37
  
With this, Kroeber opposed what I would like to call racist 
hereditarianism.
38
 The latter regarded the synchronic and diachronic behavioural 
differences between groups of people as being correlated with and mainly caused 
                                                
37
 Kroeber defined “[h]eight above the base” as “degree of advancement, whether that be 
complexity, heterogeneity, degree of coördination, or anything else” (Kroeber 1917: 211; Emph. 
added). A page later, he refers to the increase in number of cultural items and complexity of social 
organization as the things that distinguish us from the Neandertal people as example of the 
primitive man. The terms advancement or progress pop up here and there in 1917 and also in other 
papers. Despite these progressivistic wording, Kroeber tries to distance himself from 
progressivism by stressing: that “[n]othing is more erroneous than the wide-spread idea and oft-
repeated statement that the savage is only a child” (Kroeber 1910: 445), a statement that directly 
leads to a critique of Darwin and like-minded thinkers who claim that the “savage is in a stage 
intermediate between the higher animals and ourselves.” (ibid.) Kroeber also stresses that ”[a]ll 
men are totally civilized” (Kroeber 1915: 286) and that he does not use the term civilization for 
“high” civilization, since for him it makes perfectly sense to talk about “Apache civilization” 
(Kroeber 1918: 355), which includes their language, their kinship systems, habits, religion, diet 
etc. – The just cited examples give a mixed message for the question whether Kroeber was still 
progressivist and thus less radical in terms of cultural relativism than his teacher Boas. A precise 
answer is, however, not central for the issues raised here, even if it is important in its own right; it 
has to wait for another occasion.  
38
 Kroeber also opposed eugenics, for instance, in Kroeber (1916a: 34-37; 1916c: 370; 1917: 188-
9). If eugenics is understood as Kroeber did, that is, in a narrow way as assuming that progress 
cannot be achieved by social reform (hereditarian eugenics), then it also ignores the possibility of 
long-term human betterment by cultural inheritance. If eugenics is understood to include 
Lamarckian points of view, then it reduces culture to environmental influence that is projected into 
the next generation via biological inheritance. Cooke (1998) suggests that eugenics was 
Lamarckian, a kind of 'soft' eugenics, before 1915 and predominantly hereditarian in the narrow 
sense afterwards.  
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by innate differences in ability to produce these cultural differences. Thus, greater 
wealth and power of one group of people can be correlated with and regarded as 
being due to higher innate intelligence. In a diachronic perspective, every cultural 
change (civilization) is then accompanied by a change in innate endowment. This 
is what Kroeber denies.
39
 But note that, by assuming an inborn faculty of man for 
civilization and by assuming innate individual differences, Kroeber also 
subscribed to a hereditarian basis of human existence. He merely rejected its racist 
version.
40
  
In addition, by looking at culture in this manner, cultural inheritance – 
symbolized by the dotted line – emerges as the very process that makes culture 
‘superorganic’. If civilization and biological evolution are as decoupled as 
Kroeber assumes, then culture becomes clearly visible as a separate, second 
system of inheritance and change. In the end, culture is conceived as being 
independent of biological heredity (culture as superorganic) and, at the same time, 
it is conceived as heredity of another sort.  
Kroeber’s conceptual perspective is also reflected in his ethnographic 
practice. The papers we looked at so far are clearly programmatic without much 
reference to ethnographic data. Yet, when he writes, for instance, about the 
Indians of the Southwest in 1918, in a paper called “Heredity, Environment, and 
Civilization”, he shortly dismisses heredity and environment as factors to explain 
the “phenomena of group conduct or culture” (Kroeber 1918: 352). After 
introducing civilization as a third factor, he explains that the similarities and 
differences between different groups of people in the South West (Pueblo Indians, 
Navaho, Apache, Pima, Mohave, Luiseno, Gabrielino) can be described by 
singling out a “center of our area” and degrees of distance to that centre. This 
distance is identified not by physical differences of the people or by geographical 
differences in their habitats, but by cultural differences, which accumulate with 
increasing distance to the centre. The similarities between the groups are thus 
explained by diffusion from the centre. The partitioning of America in distinct 
areas is then done by so-called culture areas, which are isolated according to 
cultural differences, and not according to physical or geographic differences.
41
  
                                                
39
 Kroeber does not say that he can empirically prove that he is right. He merely states that the 
others cannot prove that they are right. See for instance Kroeber (1916a: 34).  
40
 Kroeber (1916a: 35). In Kroeber (1916a: 36 and 1917: 189-192) he therefore refers to Galton as 
being right in claiming that “between individuals mental faculties are inherited in the same ration 
and degree, and therefore presumably in the same manner, as physical traits […] But it is an 
entirely uncompelling inference when he then proceeds to explain the diversity between the 
attainments of social groups such as ancient Athenians, modern Englishmen, Africans, and 
Australian natives, as due to differences between the average inherited faculties of the bodies of 
men carrying the civilizations of these social groups” (Kroeber 1916a: 35). “That heredity operates 
in the domain of mind as well as that of the body, is one thing; that therefore heredity is the 
mainspring of civilization, is an entirely different proposition, without any necessary connection, 
and certainly without any established connection, with the former conclusion” (Kroeber 1917: 
192).  
41
 Although Kroeber did not invent the concept of culture areas, he counts, besides Clark Wissler, 
as the main influence in the development, use, and spread of this concept in the US. See Kroeber 
(1931) and Driver (1962).  
If there is nothing beyond the organic ... 
 - 13 - 
The joining of hands across the gulf 
Given that we can replace Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics with 
social or cultural inheritance, Kroeber assumes that “[b]iology and history can 
join hands in alliance across the gulf that separates them.”
42
 From a close 
intertwining interaction of culture and nature in the concept of Lamarckian 
inheritance of acquired characteristics, we moved with Kroeber to a strict 
separation of nature and culture on the basis of the concept of hard inheritance. 
According to Kroeber, this conceptual separation should be linked to a 
disciplinary one: biologists should limit their study to biological heredity and the 
respective organic mental faculties and should leave the explanation of the 
superorganic culture to the historically working anthropologists. To return, where 
we started: if there is something superorganic, anthropologists do not have to turn 
into biologists. Instead, biologists are invited to “join them in a coöperative effort 
to establish the exact nature and the precise limits of the organic and the 
superorganic.”
43
  
In the end, Kroeber's plea for a coalition became true, for instance, when 
Thomas H. Morgan indeed joined in. Already in 1924, in a paper called “Human 
Inheritance,” and again in his “The Scientific Basis of Evolution,” he presents 
social evolution and its peculiar process of “inheritance” as Ersatz for Lamarckian 
inheritance of acquired characteristics, for which he sees no experimental 
evidence.
44
 Social inheritance can be such an Ersatz precisely because it leads to 
the same effects, i.e. because it is functionally equivalent: efforts to change or to 
learn during one’s lifetime are heritable and thus not pointless from an inter-
generational, evolutionary point of view. Consequently, Morgan advocates the 
same interdisciplinary division of labour between geneticists and anthropologists 
Kroeber asked for.  
 
 
 
3. Consequences for the concept of culture and the history of 
hereditarian thinking  
Even if the concept of culture is still subject to controversial debates, not much 
has changed with respect to Kroeber’s claim that culture is a system of change 
that is maintained via a distinctive inter-individual, trans-generational process of 
cultural inheritance. In this sense culture is even today conceived as a thing sui 
generis, as autonomous. Let me illustrate this last point in a systematic way by 
distinguishing between three roles the concept of culture has played up to the time 
of Kroeber's boundary work.  
                                                
42
 Kroeber (1916a: 39).  
43
 Kroeber (1916b: 295).  
44
 Morgan (1932: 187-217) 
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Three theoretical roles of the concept of culture 
Without further historical argument, I want to claim that up to the 1920s, with 
respect to the dichotomy between culture and nature, there have been three major 
theoretical roles the anthropological concept of culture played in the explanation 
of behaviour:  
- (C 1) Culture has often been understood as behavioural and symbolic 
patterns distinctive of a society. It has thus to be understood as an 
explanandum, something that is to be explained, by nature, environment, 
or culture, or all of them. I count Tylor’s classic anthropological definition 
of culture as an exemplar of this category: “Culture or Civilization, taken 
in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and other capabilities and 
habits acquired by man as a member of a society.“
45
 This definition does 
not imply, as it is sometimes interpreted, that culture is explained by 
cultural inheritance in the sense Kroeber means it. The phrase ‘acquired as 
a member of society’ is ambiguous; it can mean ‘acquired via social 
learning’ but it does not have to. The phrase ‘acquired as a member of a 
society’ in Tylor’s definition seem to bear no systematic role in his 
account and it can also be understood to simply refer to the fact that 
culture relates to a society of which the individual is a member, 
irrespective of how the respective cultural traits are acquired.  
- (C 2) Franz Boas is well known to have initiated a first step in the 
decoupling of heredity and culture. He regarded culture as a more-or-less 
important factor in the generation of behaviour of individuals. Boas 
predominantly regards culture as a special kind of environment, a social 
environment that influences individual development. Culture thus becomes 
an explanans: culture helps explaining behaviour, but has to be 
distinguished from other factors, like race, in such an explanation of 
behaviour.
46
 
- (C 3) Kroeber went a decisive step further. He explicitly took culture as a 
system of change and inheritance in its own right, one that relies on social 
heritage. Culture thus becomes again an explanandum, but a new one. And 
although the early Kroeber thought that culture is also the only explanans 
for culture as explanandum (only culture explains culture), the late 
Kroeber admitted that many factors are involved in bringing about the 
inter-individual system of change and inheritance he called culture.
47
 
                                                
45
 Tylor (1871: 1). Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that Tylor, as does Kroeber, says that he 
considers questions of race as practically irrelevant for his goals (Tylor 1871: 7).  
46
 See Stocking (1968: 212-220). My point holds even if Boas sometimes pointed to social 
learning as part of culture, since he did not treat cultural inheritance as a central aspect. To ignore 
the point that Boas treats culture predominantly as factor in the explanation of behavior leads to an 
identification of “cultural determinism” with “behavioural determinism” or “cultural determination 
of behavior”, as Stocking does. This confuses the more radical sense ‘culture explains culture’ 
(cultural determinism) with the sense of ‘culture explains behavior’ (behavioural determinism).   
47
 Nonetheless, Kroeber uses culture in the other two ways vis-a-vis the one he added. This is most 
evident in Kroeber (1918).  
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It is this last step that I wanted to stress, since it is usually ignored, e.g. even by 
Stocking, who is well-known for his work on the history of anthropology 
(especially on Boas, Kroeber, Lamarckism in social science, and the culture 
concept) and by Cravens and Degler, who are well known for their work on the 
history of hereditarian thought. Although Stocking, for instance, realizes that 
Kroeber radicalised Boas approach and further developed the concept of culture, 
he looks at the concept of culture through a Boasian lens and does not clearly 
distinguish the second and third way of using the concept of culture. He writes for 
instance that Boas’ and Kroeber’s concept of culture provided “a functionally 
equivalent substitute for the older idea of ‘race temperament’. It explained all the 
same phenomena, but it did so in strictly non-biological terms, and indeed its full 
efficacy as an explanatory concept depended on the rejection of the inheritance of 
acquired characters.”
48
 This is misleading. Boas and Kroeber, first of all, did not 
have the same concept of culture, since in Kroeber’s hands culture became a 
system of change and inheritance in its own right, while Boas strongly rejected the 
concept of culture as superorganic. Secondly, Kroeber's concept did not simply 
explain the same phenomena, since the concept of culture changed its theoretical 
role – from an explanans to an explanandum.
49
 
The distinction between the three theoretical roles of the culture concept is 
not only helpful to revise the history of the concept of culture. It is even helpful to 
understand contemporary debates about the relationship between culture and 
nature, given the disciplinary differentiation we have nowadays. First, Boas 
concept is the one that still dominates nature-nurture-debates in psychology and 
behavioural genetics. Kroeber’s concept, however, is the one that is used in 
debates about man’s place in nature and in those about the interaction between 
biological evolution and cultural change. In other words, the first is used in 
developmental contexts, the second in evolutionary contexts. Both contexts 
involve different questions of interactions.  
In addition, some people still ignore Kroeber’s concept. Evolutionary 
psychologists, for instance, reduce culture to a mere triggering condition of 
innately specified behavioural patterns. Cosmides and Tooby, thus, define culture 
as “any mental, behavioural, or material commonalities shared across individuals 
[…] regardless of why these commonalities exist”.
50
 Culture is here the 
                                                
48
 Stocking (1968: 265). Cravens (1978) and Degler (1991) also use the term culture mainly for an 
environmental factor in the development of individuals. Degler comes close to my point, when he 
writes that Kroeber demanded “more than a mere change in assumptions as Boas had done; he was 
insisting upon a new mode of explanation for human behavior” (Degler 1991: 94). Freeman (1983) 
probably is closest to my point of view, but he does not distinguish between different roles of the 
culture concept.  
49
 That Kroeber wanted to distinguish his concept of culture from Boas’ is also evident from 
Kroeber & Kluckhohn (1952), a review of various definitions and concepts of culture, for which 
they became famous later on. In this they put Boas together with Tylor into the category of 
“descriptive” definitions using enumerations and Kroeber into this and into a second category of 
“historical” definitions: definitions with “emphasis on social heritage”, even though the early 
papers of Kroeber at centre here are ignored in this review.  
50
 Cosmides & Tooby (1992: 117). 
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explanandum, the specific attributes of a group of a people. It is not a factor in the 
explanation of what people do; it is the explanandum, the phenomenon to explain. 
At the same time, it is not an explanandum in Kroeber’s sense. On the contrary, it 
is considered as merely ‘evoked’ through experience in the world. Thus, culture 
(mental, behavioural, or material commonalities) is basically innate. The influence 
of innately specified characteristics of mind is decisive and explanatorily central. 
The influences of the natural and social environment are mere triggering 
conditions.  
Yet, the social environment is what others, dual-or-multiple-inheritance-
theorists
51
 as well as ‘standard social scientists,’ call culture: a distinctive factor in 
the explanation of behaviour, that is, an explanans, and a special explanandum at 
the same time, namely a separate second system of inheritance of ideational units 
that can and needs to be studied in its own right. And this is exactly what Kroeber 
wanted to say – with the help of Weismann’s concept of hard inheritance. And 
this is why I regard his case as historically and systematically important. In a way, 
Kroeber’s case and the three different usages of the concept of culture offered 
above show that evolutionary psychologist ignore a century of debates on the 
concept of culture and ‘atavistically’ fall back to the 19
th
-century concept of 
culture, used by Tylor and long ago abandoned in anthropology.
52
  
With dual-or-multiple-inheritance-theorists the last argument (that 
evolutionary psychologists atavistically ignore the importance of the fact that 
culture is a second system of inheritance) can even be taken further and leads to a 
fourth theoretical role of the concept of culture. What Kroeber (almost altogether) 
ignores is that culture interacts with the biological system of inheritance not only 
at an ontogenetic, but also at a phylogenetic level, influencing thereby the 
distribution of genes in subsequent generations. He ends up with a phylogenetic-
parallelist point of view, devoid of interaction at an evolutionary, i.e., 
phylogenetic level. Yet, contemporary multiple inheritance model, e.g. if they 
take niche construction seriously, take the last step – dialectically with and against 
Kroeber – back to a more interactionist view; they introduce a fourth theoretical 
role of the culture concept.  
(C 4) Culture is a factor, an explanans, not only in the ontogenetic 
development of individuals but a factor in the phylogenetic process of (culture and 
nature interacting in) the evolution of organisms – that have a body, a mind and a 
culture. Niche construction and niche inheritance use culture exactly in that fourth 
sense. And we should not forget that already James M. Baldwin (1861-1934), and 
                                                
51
 Such as Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981), Boyd & Richerson (1985), Durham (1991), 
Richerson & Boyd (2005), or Jablonka & Lamb (2005) and the niche construction theory of 
Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman 2003.   
52
 A more detailed critique of evolutionary psychology along the lines of a history of the concept 
of culture can be found in Kronfeldner (forthcoming). Note that what I have said so far holds even 
though – from our contemporary perspective – we might question whether a psychic unity of man 
is justified, since mind or mental abilities are themselves developmental products of nature and 
nurture. No child is born with a ready-made mind. Culture would then start off from a mere 
genetic unity of mankind. This has been stressed by John Dupré (2004, 1993). 
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others at the beginning of the 20
th
 century, made a similar usage of culture as a 
factor in the evolution of organisms.
53
 
The historical impact of the concept of hard inheritance 
I will now drive home the second general point of this essay. What was the 
historical impact of Weismann’s concept of hard inheritance on how the 
relationship between nature and culture was conceived? I want to defend the 
following three theses and I claim originality only for the last:  
- (H 1) First, inheritance of acquired characteristics or soft inheritance in 
general allowed for soft hereditarianism. On the basis of soft inheritance, 
one could be a hereditarian and give culture a significant role to play in the 
evolutionary process, since the hereditary material itself was considered as 
being soft, that is, malleable by cultural or environmental influences. 
Culture, and that includes education and social reform, could play a role in 
evolutionary as well as developmental explanations without the need to 
refer to social or cultural inheritance.  
- (H 2) Given Weismann’s concept of hard inheritance, this possibility was 
gone. As long as cultural inheritance is ignored, hard inheritance leads to 
a hard hereditarianism, a picture where cultural and environmental 
influences cannot exert any influence on the evolutionary process and have 
thus also a secondary, less central influence on developmental processes. 
One could reduce explanations of organismic traits (be they physical or 
behavioural) to biological inheritance by combining the continuity of the 
germ plasm with the view that the germ plasm is the sole hereditary 
material transferred down the generations of individuals.
54
  
Both of these claims are more or less part of the received view on the impact of 
soft and hard inheritance. Yet the received view also takes it for granted that the 
concept of hard inheritance was therefore partly responsible for the vogue of hard 
hereditarianism – a view where nurture (natural environment and culture) does 
not play any explanatory role anymore. And indeed, at least until the end of World 
War I, geneticists as well as the general public predominantly believed in the 
power of biological inheritance to explain behavioural differences (within and 
between groups). At least, they usually did not say anything to the contrary.
55
 This 
is why Bowler, for instance, writes that the “social consequences of biological 
                                                
53
 The relationship between Baldwin, Boas and Kroeber would deserve close investigation here but 
has to wait for another occasion. Consult Simpson (1953) or Weber & Depew (2003) for more on 
the ‘Baldwin effect’. 
54
 It was the latter, that has often wrongly been attributed to Weismann, as I have shown above.  
55
 See Ludmerer (1972), Kevles (1985), Barker (1989), Paul (1995: 40-49). The concept of hard 
inheritance surely was not the only reason for the dominance of hereditarianism, but it is usually 
taken as one of the reasons. Part of the hereditarian bias might have been due to the growing 
scientific success of genetics as an experimental science in explaining biological heredity. Part of 
it might have been due to socio-political views, part of it due to institutional developments, as 
Cravens (1978) suggests. Usually, Johannsen is cited as an early exception to the rule of 
‘geneticists were hereditarians’, and Morgan and Jennings as exceptions of the 20s, e.g. in Paul 
(1995: 115-117).  
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determinism” are not a product of social Darwinism or Darwinism as such, but a 
product of the rise of genetics, which “represents the collapse of a pre-Darwinian 
‘developmental’ view of nature with consequences that were at least as profound 
as those associated with the initial conversion to evolutionism.”
56
 – I depart from 
this received view by claiming that:  
- (H 3) Since nothing in the concept of hard inheritance prevented one from 
acknowledging cultural inheritance, the connection between the concept of 
hard inheritance and biological determinism (or hard hereditarianism, 
choose your term) is neither necessary nor historically true, as the 
examples of Weismann and Kroeber show.  
The concept of hard inheritance was thus not exclusively linked to 
hereditarianism, or, to put it in other words, the concept of hard inheritance did 
not have an unambiguous, unidirectional historical influence. To the contrary, it 
had an important historical impact on the rise of the concept of culture as a 
superorganic, separate system of change and inheritance: a concept of culture that 
helped to break the hereditarian consensus in the US of the early 20
th
 century, that 
strongly relies on the idea of cultural inheritance, that thereby helped establish the 
boundaries of cultural anthropology, and did so by crossing the boundaries to 
biology. In the end, a new phenomenon was established, culture as a new 
explanandum, a phenomenon that needs its own academic approach for treatment, 
namely cultural anthropology.  
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